Energy Independence & Australian Productivity

The Modern Movement Australia programme is Sovereign Australia’s energy policy. This memo states what it does to fuel security, power prices, vehicle running costs, freight costs and productivity. Coal plants run until they are undercut on price. Australian oil is drilled and refined here. Net zero follows as an outcome; the arithmetic is published on the MMA site.

1. Australia’s fuel position

Australia imports almost all of its refined transport fuel — the published range runs from four fifths to nine tenths — and holds somewhere between four and five weeks of it. Stocks have risen: the Commonwealth put diesel at 34 days during the 2026 crisis and called it the highest in fifteen years, and the reserve is being built out further. That improvement was bought with a $14.8 billion package, and it is still short of the ninety-day obligation Australia signed. We are the only member not meeting it and have not met it since 2012. Japan and South Korea hold more than two hundred days.

Two refineries remain of the set we had at the turn of the century, both on public support, and Australia now runs the largest refined-petroleum trade deficit in the world. We produce crude and export about 94 per cent of it, then buy the fuel back from someone else’s refinery. About half of our diesel imports pass through or originate from refineries exposed to the Strait of Hormuz.

Both refineries run on imported crude. Australian production is mostly light condensate they are not built to process, so it is exported and heavier grades are bought in. Refining onshore in its present form relocates one link of the dependency rather than removing it. Combined capacity is about 230,000 barrels a day against national consumption near 1,150,000 — roughly a fifth of demand. About 450,000 barrels a day of capacity closed between 2014 and 2021.

The fuel arrives on ships Australia does not own. There is no Australian-flagged refined-product tanker on the register. Imports of about 850,000 barrels a day require roughly three tanker cargoes a day, or 80 to 90 a month, all foreign-flagged and foreign-crewed, dispatched by owners under no obligation to serve Australia first. The planned strategic fleet is about a dozen ships.

Demand is also rising rather than falling. Diesel imports went from 11.24 thousand megalitres in 2012 to 29.8 thousand in 2023, and about 91 per cent of the diesel burned here is now imported. Diesel is the fuel that moves freight, mining and agriculture, and it is the hardest part of the task to electrify quickly. A further single point of failure sits behind it: about 99 per cent of heavy diesel trucks require AdBlue, made from gas-derived urea, and urea stock was reported at around ten days during the 2026 crisis.

This is not hypothetical. In early 2026 the Strait was constrained rather than closed, six product tankers were cancelled or deferred, South Korea capped its refined exports, the Commonwealth relaxed diesel specifications to widen supply and turned to the United States as an emergency supplier for the first time in decades. Wholesale diesel rose about 67 per cent in two months and farmers ran out during the seeding window. The Strait was not closed.

And the fuel has to move once it lands. One rail line links the east coast to Perth, carrying roughly 80 per cent of Western Australia’s supermarket goods; it has been cut by floods three times in four years. In the 2022 closure, buying limits went on, shelves emptied of pasta, sugar and medicines, and Foodbank WA’s deliveries fell from forty pallets a week to none. Same rail network to Darwin.

Under the Castle Defence doctrine this is a defence exposure, not only an energy one: an island economy can be forced to stop by closing its supply lines rather than by attack.

That package — the Fuel Security and Resilience Package — buys a permanent reserve of about a billion litres targeting fifty days of cover, plus a strategic fleet of about a dozen ships. Both are real and neither produces fuel. Fifty days is short of the ninety-day obligation, a stockpile drains, and the fleet still carries imported product through the same chokepoints. During the 2026 event the response was of the same kind — 762 million litres released from reserves, fuel-quality standards relaxed to add roughly 100 million litres a month, rationing modelled if diesel fell toward ten days, and the excise halved for three months at a cost of about $2.9 billion in forgone revenue. Every measure moved or stretched existing fuel. The standing cost of the arrangement was about $59 billion a year in 2023 and is rising.

2. Reducing the demand

Stockholding and refining address the supply side. The demand side is the larger lever: fuel that is not required cannot be embargoed, price-shocked or run down. Sovereign Australia’s energy policy is the Modern Movement Australia programme, delivered by the Sovereign Build Corporation. Its full detail is published on the MMA site — the Energy and Oil pillars, Freight, and The Plan.

The mechanism is price, not mandate. Continental desert solar, an HVDC backbone carried on the corridor structure that is being built anyway for freight and passenger rail, and pumped hydro at the Alice Hub to firm it, together drive consumer electricity under ten cents a kilowatt hour. At that price the substitution happens on its own:

• Light vehicles. Households change cars when they were going to change cars, and choose on running cost. Nobody is told what to drive.
• Heavy freight. The long haul moves from diesel road train to electric rail, and the truck’s job becomes the fifty to two hundred kilometre run from the rail terminal to the farm, the mine or the port.
• Mining and agricultural diesel. Both sectors are over 90 per cent reliant on diesel and sit at the end of the longest supply chains in the country. Corridor electrification and on-farm generation retire that demand progressively.
• Industrial heat. Cheap power makes electric boilers, heat pumps and furnaces the commercial choice, while the corridor’s gas connection keeps domestic gas at domestic cost for the high-temperature work that cannot yet be electrified.

The electricity is generated in Australia and carried on Australian infrastructure, so each unit of substitution replaces an imported input with a domestic one. Consumption does not fall; the source changes.

3. Coal generation and domestic oil through the transition

The build takes about two decades. Through that period the country needs firm, cheap generation and its own liquid fuel.

No legislated coal closure dates. Australia’s coal plants are being closed to a political timetable rather than an engineering one, before their replacements exist, and the bill arrives on every household’s power account. Sovereign Australia suspends the closure orders. Plants run until cheaper generation takes their dispatch, which is how coal has exited competitive electricity markets elsewhere. Legislated dates carry three costs that price-based exit does not: blackout risk from early closure, stranded-asset compensation claims, and the loss of a coal town on a date set elsewhere.

Drill it, refine it, store it. While the country still burns liquid fuel — and it will for years — the barrels should be Australian. Open the acreage, approve the tight oil and gas, keep the two remaining refineries running, and rebuild the ninety-day reserve on Australian soil with the Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984 enforced rather than shelved. Domestic gas gets a reservation policy so Australian industry pays Australian prices for an Australian resource.

Exploration, not geology, is the constraint. Dorado, off the Pilbara coast, was the largest oil discovery in Western Australia this century, found in 2018 by a well drilled for gas. Its Bedout Sub-basin has had about seventeen exploration wells against more than fifteen hundred in the Carnarvon Basin next door, and the Great Australian Bight is essentially untested. A sovereign exploration programme across the frontier basins is the first step.

Refining has to match what Australia produces. The existing plants cannot run the country’s light condensate. Modular refineries — skid-mounted units built in under a year at a fraction of the cost of a legacy plant, in topping and splitter configurations suited to light condensate — process Australian crude onshore. Once built, that capacity also takes other feedstock and produces finished product for sale.

Fuel is also grown. After the 2025–26 harvest about 5.84 million tonnes of canola sat in Australian silos, equivalent to roughly 2.2 billion litres of biodiesel, or 34 to 37 days of national diesel. A standing rule reserving half of each year’s crop for domestic processing yields 1.1 to 1.3 billion litres a year — 18 to 22 days of diesel from domestic feedstock, annually, with no tanker involved. Renewable diesel and sustainable aviation fuel use the same and additional feedstocks.

And one existing subsidy works against all of it. The Fuel Tax Credit scheme refunds excise on off-road and heavy-vehicle diesel at about $10 billion a year. It holds imported diesel below its real cost and, on one major miner’s own analysis, roughly halves the return on converting a fleet to electric. Redirecting it from rebating imported diesel to backing electrification and domestic fuel production is among the faster levers available.

Coal generation and transport electrification are not in conflict. The arithmetic is in the MMA memo The Coal Paradox. The grid does not have to be decarbonised before transport is electrified. An electric vehicle charged on a coal-heavy grid produces about 144 grams of CO₂ a kilometre; the average Australian petrol car produces 191. The electric drivetrain converts energy to motion at better than ninety per cent efficiency against a petrol engine’s twenty-five to thirty, so it wins even when the power comes from coal — and every one of those vehicles gets cleaner on its own as the grid changes underneath it, with no trade-in required.

The policy is therefore five things at once: coal retained for firm cheap power, a sovereign exploration and modular refining effort matched to Australian crude, domestic biofuel from reserved feedstock, transport electrified on the existing grid, and the desert solar, storage and corridor built so that coal is undercut commercially. Each reduces the fuel import bill as it happens.

4. Lower prices, EV uptake, higher productivity

Energy is an input to every sector. Its price is a productivity measure.

For a household: at today’s retail prices an electric vehicle is roughly three times cheaper to run per kilometre than petrol. At ten cents a kilowatt hour it is 8.9 times cheaper — about $270 a year against $2,400 for the same driving. The saving closes the purchase premium in three to five years and continues for the life of the vehicle.

That running cost, not a mandate or a rebate, is what drives uptake. A rebate is a one-off transfer of a few thousand dollars; the running-cost gap is about $2,000 a year for the life of the vehicle, and it applies to every buyer — private, fleet, rideshare and trade. Uptake follows the price: high-mileage operators first, then small business fleets, then mainstream buyers, then the second-hand market, which is what puts electric vehicles within reach of low-income households. Each vehicle removes its own imported-fuel demand from the day of purchase.

Freight is the larger number, and it sits in the price of everything on a shelf. Australia moves around 178 billion tonne-kilometres a year on semi-trailers, on diesel that is mostly imported. Road freight costs somewhere between two and six times more per tonne-kilometre than rail, depending on the corridor. The general freight rail that should be carrying it — groceries, manufactured goods, farm produce, fuel — is around five per cent of the national task, on a network that has not been seriously expanded in fifty years. The gap between what freight costs and what it should cost is tens of billions of dollars a year, taken out of regional business, farm margins and household budgets.

The cost is already closing businesses. One in twelve Australian trucking businesses closed in the year to November 2025 — before the 2026 diesel spike, which pushed wholesale diesel up about 67 per cent in two months and had operators parking trucks and laying off drivers. Fuel is roughly thirty per cent of a trucking operator’s costs; a rise like that cannot be absorbed. The same squeeze hits farmers twice, on the tractor and again at the farm gate, and it is one of the reasons regional abattoirs, dairies, packing sheds and small manufacturers have been losing the cost competition with imports for thirty years.

Electric freight on continental rail changes three cost variables: the energy cost is lower, it is stable because it is not exposed to an overseas chokepoint, and at corridor speed the service competes with road for perishables. Cheap, firm, domestic power raises the competitiveness of manufacturing, mining, agriculture and data processing at the same time.

5. China: the same mechanism, at national scale

China has switched fastest, and did it in the sequence this policy uses: government planned and built the infrastructure over four decades — the electrified rail network and the transmission to run it — and adoption followed on price.

Uptake continued as subsidies were withdrawn. Electric and plug-in vehicles reached a record share of Chinese new car sales in 2026 — above 60 per cent, and 62.9 per cent of retail sales in May — while purchase subsidies were rolled back and a tax on new energy vehicles was reintroduced. Petrol sales fell faster than electric sales. The share rose because the vehicles are cheaper to buy and to run, not because they were subsidised.

And the bigger oil displacement is not the cars — it is the rail. China’s railway network reached about 162,000 kilometres by the end of 2024, roughly three quarters of it electrified, with more than 70 per cent of non-urban rail kilometres running on electricity. Moving freight by rail is around thirty times less oil-intensive than moving it by road. The International Energy Agency’s comparison: the oil saved by Chinese non-urban rail in a single year exceeds the oil displaced globally by every battery-electric car on the road worldwide. Australia has no continental electric rail network.

The infrastructure was planned, not left to the market. The electrification, the high-speed network and the transmission were built by government over forty years, and the commercial transition followed. That is the sequence this policy proposes: government builds the corridor — rail, transmission, water, fibre — and price does the switching. Two qualifications. China did subsidise heavily in the early years to build manufacturing scale, and Australia need not repeat that, because the scale now exists and the products are already cheap. And China kept its coal fleet running through the build rather than closing it to a timetable, which is the position at section 3.

6. Power exported into the Asia-Pacific

The same generation, built at continental scale, produces a surplus. The Asia-Pacific is short of supply. The MMA memo The Asia-Pacific Subsea Corridor Network sets out how it is delivered: seven subsea multi-service corridors radiating from Australia, roughly 32,500 kilometres in total, each carrying HVDC electricity and fibre as standard, with gas, hydrogen or water added where the destination country wants them.

The starter set reaches about 600 million people across seven economies — Singapore, Indonesia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines and the Pacific island chain — and as those nations extend their own connections it pools into a regional grid serving two to three billion people, with Australia as the central node and the largest generator. The Darwin–Singapore route is the Sun Cable alignment, already approved by both the Australian Government and Singapore’s Energy Market Authority, and the political framework is in place through the ASEAN Power Grid Enhanced MoU and the ASEAN Subsea Power Cable Development Framework.

What it delivers:

• Revenue that does not deplete. Coal, iron ore and gas are sold once. A cable sells electricity every hour it operates, for the life of the asset.
• An industry, not a project. Cable manufacturing, a cable-lay and pipe-lay vessel fleet, converter stations, subsea connectors, survey ships and a permanent regional repair fleet — built and crewed here. The global fleet of HVDC-capable cable-lay vessels numbers fewer than two dozen ships; this network needs its own.
• It uses the AUKUS industrial base. The dockyards, heavy fabrication and marine workforce commissioned under AUKUS build and crew this fleet, keeping the yards loaded between naval build cycles. A sovereign cable-lay and repair fleet is also a strategic maritime asset.
• It gets cheaper as it goes. The first install of a route carries the survey, the approvals, the landing stations and the engineering; every install after that reuses them. Unit costs fall with each lift, the way solar and wind fell once they were productised.
• A more stable grid at home. Interconnection runs both ways. New Zealand hydro can firm the eastern Australian grid while Australian solar firms New Zealand — the same logic that has run the European grid commercially since the 1950s.
• Security through integration. Nations sharing power, data and gas infrastructure hold a standing interest in each other’s stability. Shared infrastructure is cheaper than the military alternative.

Each gigawatt delivered into Jakarta, Manila, Hanoi or Singapore displaces coal or diesel burned there. The mechanism is dispatch order, not a credit transaction: a cheaper source arrives and the fossil plant runs fewer hours.

The same applies to liquid fuel. Australia currently exports raw energy and imports finished fuel. Once domestic demand is covered, the refining, biofuel, renewable diesel, sustainable aviation fuel, green ammonia and e-methanol capacity built to cover it produces a surplus for sale into the same region — economies sitting behind the same chokepoints Australia is leaving. The position moves from importing finished fuel to manufacturing and selling it.

7. The emissions outcome

Net zero is not the reason for this policy and is not argued for here. It is an outcome of the build, and the figures are stated so they are on the record. The MMA memo The Net Zero Path to 2050 Target sets out the arithmetic in full. Its headline figures, as programme estimates at maturity rather than measurements: about 140 million tonnes a year retired from the electricity grid, 80 to 100 from transport, 20 to 30 each from industrial process heat and from mining and agricultural diesel, and 15 to 25 sequestered by a billion trees planted on aqueduct water — roughly 275 to 325 million tonnes a year domestically, with a further 455 to 585 displaced in Asia-Pacific grids that run on Australian electricity delivered by HVDC. The same memo states the residual it does not close: about 145 to 195 million tonnes at 2050, in fugitive emissions, agriculture and hard-to-abate industrial chemistry. It is not offset.

For readers who weigh the climate case: this is the only Australian programme whose arithmetic closes. The Commonwealth’s own projections miss 2030 and miss 2035 by more; the five biggest transmission projects are running at roughly 140 per cent combined cost overrun and years late; there is no national programme at all for electric freight, mining diesel or industrial heat; and the solar build is colliding with farmland because it is being put in the wrong place.

For readers who do not: the fuel figures are unchanged by that view. Import dependency of 80 to 90 per cent remains the largest single supply vulnerability in the country’s defence posture, and it is not addressed by naval procurement. Domestic power remains cheaper, is made here, and cannot be embargoed.

This is why the party repeals the legislated target. A statutory date does not build transmission, and it has closed coal plants before their replacements existed, raising both prices and supply risk. The timetable is replaced by two published quarterly measures: the price of a kilowatt hour, and the share of transport energy arriving by ship.

8. What would have to change

• Adopt the corridor programme and establish the Sovereign Build Corporation to deliver it — transmission, generation, storage and the electric freight spine on one easement, elevated above the floods that keep cutting the line to Perth.
• Suspend the legislated coal closures. Plants run until they are undercut commercially. No closure dates, no stranded-asset fights, no town told its future ends on a fixed date.
• Drill and refine at home. Approve the acreage, fund a sovereign exploration programme across the frontier basins, keep the existing refineries, and build modular refining matched to Australian light condensate.
• Reserve domestic gas for domestic industry, and reserve half of each year’s canola crop for domestic biodiesel processing.
• Redirect the Fuel Tax Credit from rebating imported diesel to backing electrification and domestic fuel production.
• Flag a product tanker fleet sized against the import task while imports continue, and produce urea for AdBlue domestically.
• Rebuild the ninety-day reserve on Australian soil and enforce the Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984.
• Repeal the legislated net zero timetable and replace it with two published quarterly measures: the lowest energy prices in the developed world, and falling liquid-fuel import dependency.
• Commit to the subsea export network — the seven corridors, the Australian manufacturing and install industry behind them, and the bilateral agreements with the destination nations.
• Negotiate Article 6 credit-sharing with the Asia-Pacific nations that will run on Australian electricity, so displaced emissions are shared fairly rather than claimed unilaterally by either side.

None of this asks Australians to change how they live. It asks the country to build.

9. Summary

Australian transport, agriculture, mining and emergency services run on a fuel the country does not refine, cannot protect in transit and holds about three weeks of. The freight task runs on road at two to six times the rail cost because continental electric rail was never built. Stockholding and refining reduce the consequences of an interruption; they do not reduce the dependency, which is a function of demand.

The policy: coal retained while it is the cheap firm option, Australian oil drilled and refined here, and the continental power and electric freight built so that Australian energy is cheaper than imported fuel. The results are lower power bills, lower freight costs, competitive regional industry, and import dependency that falls commercially rather than by decree. The surplus is exported into the Asia-Pacific on infrastructure built in Australian yards. Net zero follows from the economics and from the security case rather than from a legislated target.

10. Sources

1. Sovereign Australia Party, Fuel Security policy and Federal Platform §3.3 — approximately 23 days of diesel against the International Energy Agency’s 90-day obligation; Australia the only IEA member not meeting it, and not since 2012; refineries reduced to two, both publicly supported; approximately 94 per cent of Australian crude exported and refined product imported back; the Castle Defence doctrine; the 90-day reserve, domestic refining and Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984 commitments; and the replacement of the legislated net zero target with a published price target. Cited in sections 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8.
2. Modern Movement Australia, Memo 3 — The Continental National Plan — 80–90 per cent of refined transport fuel imported and 30–37 days of stocks (the Commonwealth confirming 34 days of diesel during the 2026 crisis, its highest in fifteen years, against 200+ days held by Japan and South Korea); the world’s largest refined-petroleum trade deficit; approximately half of diesel imports exposed to the Strait of Hormuz; the March 2026 crisis (cancelled tankers, the South Korean export cap, relaxed diesel specifications, emergency United States supply, wholesale diesel up ~67 per cent in two months, farmers out of fuel in the seeding window); the Trans-Australian Railway cut by floods three times in four years, carrying ~80 per cent of Western Australian supermarket goods, with the 2022 closure producing buying limits, empty shelves, pharmacy shortages and Foodbank WA deliveries falling from 40 pallets a week to zero; mining and agriculture over 90 per cent diesel-reliant with mining demand growing 7.9 per cent a year; ~178 billion tonne-kilometres a year on articulated trucks; general freight rail at ~5 per cent of the national task; road freight two to six times the cost of rail per tonne-kilometre; one in twelve trucking businesses closed in the year to November 2025; and the elevated-viaduct answer to repeated flood closures. Cited in sections 1, 2, 4 and 8.
3. Modern Movement Australia, Memo 12 — The Coal Paradox — an electric vehicle at 144 g CO₂/km on a coal-heavy grid against 191 g/km for the Australian petrol fleet average; the efficiency comparison between electric drivetrain and petrol combustion; every electric vehicle improving as the grid changes without fleet replacement; running-cost advantage rising to 8.9 times at 10c/kWh (~$270 a year against ~$2,400); the purchase premium closing in three to five years; and the case against legislated coal closure dates in favour of coal exiting on price. Cited in sections 3 and 4.
4. Modern Movement Australia, Memo 25 — The Net Zero Path to 2050 Target — domestic retirements at maturity (electricity ~140 Mt/yr; transport ~80–100; industrial process heat ~20–30; mining and agricultural diesel ~20–30; billion-tree sequestration ~15–25) totalling ~275–325 Mt/yr; ~455–585 Mt/yr displaced in Asia-Pacific importing grids; the ~145–195 Mt residual named openly; the Article 6 credit-sharing position; the projected misses against the 2030 and 2035 targets; the ~140 per cent combined cost overrun across the five major transmission projects; and the farmland constraint on the current solar build. Programme estimates, not measurements. Cited in section 7.
5. Modern Movement Australia, Energy, Oil and Freight pillars and The Plan — desert solar, the HVDC backbone carried on the corridor structure, Alice Hub pumped hydro firming, sub-10c/kWh consumer electricity, electric heavy freight, and the corridor gas connection with domestic supply at domestic cost. Cited in sections 2 and 3.
6. Sovereign Australia Party, Inner Nation Towns (Memo 9) — the six corridors, the single multimodal easement, and where the corridor costings sit. Cited in section 2.
7. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2025 (rail feature, as reported by the International Union of Railways), Chinese national railway statistics to end-2024, China Passenger Car Association monthly retail data and IEA Global EV Outlook 2026 — a Chinese railway network of approximately 162,000 km with roughly 120,000 km (about 76 per cent) electrified and more than 70 per cent of non-urban rail kilometres electrically powered; rail freight approximately thirty times less oil-intensive than equivalent road haulage; the finding that oil saved by Chinese non-urban rail in one year exceeds the oil displaced globally by the entire battery-electric car fleet; and new energy vehicles reaching a record share above 60 per cent of Chinese new car sales in 2026 (62.9 per cent of retail sales in May) during a period of subsidy withdrawal and the reintroduction of a tax on those vehicles. Cited in section 5.
8. Modern Movement Australia, Memo 26 — The Asia-Pacific Subsea Corridor Network and the Export pillar — seven subsea multi-service corridors totalling approximately 32,500 km carrying HVDC and fibre by default with gas, hydrogen or water optional; a starter network reaching approximately 600 million people across seven economies and pooling toward 2–3 billion by 2050 with Australia as the central node; the Darwin–Singapore route as the Sun Cable alignment approved by the Australian Government (2024) and Singapore’s Energy Market Authority (2024); the ASEAN Power Grid Enhanced MoU and ASEAN Subsea Power Cable Development Framework (October 2025); the fewer-than-two-dozen global fleet of HVDC-capable cable-lay vessels; the sovereign manufacturing and install scope; the overlap with the AUKUS maritime industrial base; declining unit cost per repeat install; and bidirectional grid stabilisation on the trans-Tasman route. Cited in section 6.
9. Modern Movement Australia, Australia’s Transport Fuel Problem — and How to Fix It (Fuel Sovereignty, Part 2) and its companion The True Cost of “Cheap” Imported Fuel (Part 1) — production of ~400,000 b/d with over 94 per cent exported against consumption of ~1,150,000 b/d and refined imports of ~850,000 b/d; combined refinery capacity ~230,000 b/d (~20 per cent of demand) with ~450,000 b/d closed 2014–21, both plants running imported crude because Australian production is light condensate they cannot process; no Australian-flagged refined-product tanker on the register, ~3 cargoes a day or 80–90 a month foreign-flagged, against a planned strategic fleet of ~12 ships; diesel imports rising from 11.24 to 29.8 thousand megalitres 2012–2023 with ~91 per cent of diesel imported by 2025; ~99 per cent of heavy trucks requiring AdBlue with urea stock ~10 days in the 2026 crisis; the $14.8bn Fuel Security and Resilience Package (~1bn litres, 50-day target) and the 2026 response (762 ML released, standards relaxed ~100 ML/month, rationing modelled near 10 days of diesel, excise halved at ~$2.9bn forgone); the ~$59bn a year (2023, rising) standing cost of the import arrangement; the Fuel Tax Credit at ~$10bn a year and its effect on fleet-electrification returns; Dorado and the Bedout Sub-basin (~17 exploration wells against >1,500 in the Carnarvon Basin) and the untested Great Australian Bight; modular skid-mounted refineries suited to light condensate; ~5.84 Mt of canola in storage after the 2025–26 harvest (~2.2bn litres of biodiesel equivalent, 34–37 days of diesel; a 50 per cent domestic reservation yielding 1.1–1.3bn litres or 18–22 days a year); an all-electric passenger fleet replacing roughly one third of imported oil; and the move from importing finished fuel to manufacturing and exporting refined, renewable and synthetic fuels. Cited in sections 1, 3, 4, 6 and 8.