Israel and Palestine: The Party Position

Sovereign Australia’s position, set out issue by issue: the 1967 Green Line as the border, the Gaza genocide finding and the ICJ proceedings, Lebanon, displacement and the arrivals question, the West Bank, a full suspension of arms and components, a register of foreign military service, and foreign influence at home. One standard, applied to every state, including allies.

1. The border: the 1967 Green Line

Sovereign Australia recognises the State of Palestine on the 1967 Green Line — the armistice line as it stood before June 1967 — with East Jerusalem as its capital, alongside the State of Israel within secure and recognised borders. Australia’s recognition, granted at the United Nations in September 2025, stands and is not reopened.

The Green Line is not a negotiating preference. It is the line from which the International Court of Justice measured the occupation in its advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, finding Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory unlawful and requiring it to end as rapidly as possible. Any settlement that begins somewhere else begins by ratifying the acquisition of territory by force, which the UN Charter prohibits.

Variations to that line are for the two parties to agree between themselves, on equal terms, and cannot be created unilaterally by settlement, annexation or fact on the ground.

2. Gaza: the genocide finding and the Court

On 16 September 2025 the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, chaired by Navi Pillay, found that Israel is responsible for the commission of genocide in Gaza. It found four of the five acts defined in Article II of the Genocide Convention established — killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about destruction, and imposing measures to prevent births — and found genocidal intent established on the record of statements by senior Israeli officials. It recommended that genocide charges be added to the existing International Criminal Court warrants, and that states cease transferring arms and equipment that may be used in the commission of genocidal acts.

Sovereign Australia accepts that finding as credible and adopts it as the basis of policy. It is a finding by a standing UN commission, not a determination by a court.

The court proceeding is separate and unfinished. South Africa brought its case under the Genocide Convention in December 2023; the Court ordered provisional measures in January 2024, South Africa filed its memorial in October 2024, Israel filed its counter-memorial in March 2026, and on 21 May 2026 the Court fixed a Reply and Rejoinder. There has been no merits judgment. A large number of states have intervened under Article 63 on the interpretation of the Convention.

The party’s position is that Israel must answer at the International Court of Justice, and that Australia should say so and act accordingly in the meantime. Waiting for a judgment that is years away is not a neutral act while the conduct continues. The obligation under the Genocide Convention is to prevent, and prevention is not satisfied by observing.

3. Lebanon

The conduct of the campaign in Lebanon raises the same questions and belongs in the same forum. No international court or commission has yet made a determination on it. Sovereign Australia’s position is that the ICC investigation and any competent Court proceeding extend to Lebanon, and that Australia supports the referral and the funding of that work.

4. Displacement, and the arrivals question

Palestinians need a home in their own nation. Sovereign Australia’s position is that moving the population of Gaza to Australia, or anywhere else, works against the Palestinian cause: permanent removal from the land is the outcome the displacement is designed to produce, and every population transfer out of Gaza makes the two-state settlement less achievable, not more.

What the party demands instead is safe space for Palestinians inside the two-state solution — a viable state on the 1967 Green Line, with the security, reconstruction and guarantees that make living in it possible. Australia’s effort goes to securing that, to the reconstruction of Gaza, and to the humanitarian access required in the meantime.

This is the position most states in the region have taken, and taken deliberately. Under the Arab League’s Casablanca Protocol of 1965, Palestinians in member states were to be granted the right to work, to residence and to travel while retaining their Palestinian nationality. The retention is the point. Naturalising a displaced population converts people holding a right of return under General Assembly Resolution 194 into citizens of somewhere else, and settles the question without a negotiation. They are kept as refugees, registered as such across generations, precisely so that the claim survives. Jordan is the exception, having granted citizenship to most of those who came from the West Bank.

Sovereign Australia’s position follows the same reasoning. Australia does not assist in extinguishing Palestinian status by absorbing it.

This is not a position about who deserves compassion. It is a position about where the remedy lies. A policy that empties the territory and settles its people abroad concedes the ground and calls it charity.

5. The West Bank, settlements and annexation

Settlements in the occupied territory are unlawful. That has been the position of the UN Security Council in Resolution 2334 of 2016, and the International Court of Justice restated it in July 2024, holding that the settlement policy, the transfer of settlers and the associated regime breach international law and must be ended, with the settlers evacuated.

Sovereign Australia’s position: Australia does not recognise any Israeli sovereignty beyond the Green Line, opposes annexation in any form including de facto annexation by administrative measure, and applies targeted sanctions to individuals and entities engaged in settler violence, land seizure or settlement construction, and to the officials responsible for those policies. Goods produced in settlements are excluded from preferential treatment and labelled as originating in the occupied territory.

And Israel is to prosecute its own settlers. Violence by settlers against Palestinians and their property — assault, arson, killing, the destruction of olive groves, the seizure of land and water — is criminal conduct under Israeli law in territory Israel controls. Sovereign Australia’s demand is that Israel investigate those crimes, charge the offenders and prosecute them, and that it be held to that demand rather than credited for announcing it.

The record is the reason it has to be stated. Monitoring by Israeli legal organisations, principally Yesh Din, has found over two decades that the overwhelming majority of investigation files opened into ideologically motivated offences by Israelis against Palestinians close without an indictment, and that only about three per cent end in a conviction. Where soldiers are present during such attacks and do not intervene, that is a separate failure of the same obligation.

This is also what determines whether the question stays domestic. Under the principle of complementarity, international jurisdiction is a backstop for states that do not genuinely investigate and prosecute; a state that enforces its own criminal law against its own citizens removes the need for anybody else to. Australian targeted sanctions therefore remain in place until enforcement is demonstrated in charges and convictions, not undertakings.

6. Arms, components and defence-industrial ties

The Australian Government’s position is that it does not export weapons to Israel. It also participates in the global supply chain for the F-35, which is operated by the Israeli Air Force. Both statements are true at once, which is why the question has not been settled by repeating the first one.

The UN Special Rapporteur’s report of October 2025 named Australia among the states that have continued to grant or partially retain export permits while acknowledging concerns, and identified continued transfer of F-35 parts. Litigation on the point has been brought in Australia, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark and the United Kingdom.

Sovereign Australia’s position: suspend all of it. No weapons, no platforms, no parts, no sub-components, no explosives, propellants, energetics, electronics, software or dual-use items — nothing that contributes to the war effort, by any pathway, direct or through a third country or a multinational program including the F-35. The suspension holds for as long as the Commission’s finding stands unresolved by the Court.

With it: publish the full register of permits, end-users, components and destinations, which is currently not public; and legislate an end-use test that applies to parts, components and dual-use goods rather than only to complete weapons. The Arms Trade Treaty does not distinguish between defensive and non-lethal transfers, and neither should Australian law.

This is a general rule rather than a measure against one state. The same test applies to any recipient where a competent body has found a serious risk of the transferred item being used in atrocity crimes.

7. Australians who served in foreign forces

Australia does not know who its citizens have fought for. There is no register of Australian citizens and residents serving in the armed forces of foreign states, no declaration requirement, and no reporting obligation. Service in a recognised state’s regular forces is not itself an offence, and Sovereign Australia does not propose to make it one. Not knowing is a separate problem, and it is the one that has to be fixed first.

A full register. Australian citizens and permanent residents who serve, or have served since October 2023, in the armed forces of any foreign state must declare that service. The register is maintained by the Commonwealth, with aggregate numbers published by country and by year, and individual records available to the Australian Federal Police, to the courts and to any lawful inquiry. Failure to declare is an offence in itself. It applies to every country without exception — Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Russia, China and all others — because a register that covers one army is not a register.

Accountability. Australia has universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under Division 268 of the Criminal Code: the conduct is prosecutable here regardless of where it occurred or which uniform was worn. The UN Special Rapporteur recorded that thousands of nationals of third states have served in the Israeli military since October 2023, that few have been investigated and that none has been prosecuted for conduct in Gaza. The same is true across other conflicts.

Sovereign Australia’s position: where credible evidence exists that any person subject to Australian jurisdiction participated in atrocity crimes, in any conflict and in any uniform, the Australian Federal Police investigate and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions decides on the evidence. The war-crimes investigative capacity is funded to do that work rather than left nominal.

And the political veto goes. Division 268 proceedings cannot commence without the written consent of the Attorney-General. That places a political decision in front of a criminal one, and it is the reason the provisions have almost never been used. Sovereign Australia removes the consent requirement, so the decision to prosecute an atrocity crime is made by the prosecutor on the evidence, as it is for every other serious offence.

No safe haven. A foreign soldier credibly alleged to have committed atrocity crimes should not be able to enter, transit or reside in Australia without that allegation being examined. Visa decisions and entry screening apply the same test to every foreign military, and Australia supports the international accountability mechanisms — the ICC and any competent court proceeding — rather than sheltering personnel from them.

8. Foreign influence at home

This is the part already committed in the federal platform, under the foreign-influence Royal Commission. The standard is uniform: registration and disclosure of foreign-aligned political activity, with no exemption for an ally.

The documented matters within scope include the description by former Foreign Minister Bob Carr of the pro-Israel lobby as the largest foreign influence operation run in Australia; research finding that Australian parliamentarians take more privately sponsored trips to Israel than to any other country; and sponsored travel by senior figures during periods of active international scrutiny. These are facts on the public record and they may have entirely ordinary explanations. The Commission exists to establish which, under oath.

The identical test applies to pro-Palestinian organisations, to China-aligned bodies, to United States-funded institutes and to every other externally funded attempt to shape Australian policy. A standard that exempts a friend is not a standard.

9. Where the parties stand

The eight issues above, against the positions of the parties that will vote on them.

Positions are summarised from party platforms, media releases, parliamentary statements and votes as at July 2026, and are cited at section 11. “No stated position” means none was found on the public record, not that a party is indifferent. One Nation’s positions come from Senator Hanson’s statements and Senate interventions rather than a published policy document. Positions on Gaza arrivals are drawn from statements made during 2024 and 2025 as visa decisions were taken. Labor’s and the Coalition’s positions are those of the parties in government and opposition and may move; the Greens abandoned formal support for a two-state framework in 2023. This table states each party’s position, not this party’s characterisation of it.

10. Summary

The border is the 1967 Green Line, and Australia’s recognition of Palestine stands. A standing UN commission has found Israel responsible for genocide in Gaza; the party accepts that finding, holds that Israel must answer for it at the International Court of Justice, and holds that Lebanon warrants the same examination. Palestinians are not resettled abroad and their status is not absorbed away; the remedy is a viable state on that line. Settlements are unlawful and annexation is not recognised; Israel is to prosecute settlers who commit crimes against Palestinians, and targeted sanctions apply to those driving the enterprise until it does. Every military export stops — weapons, parts, sub-components, explosives and dual-use goods alike — and the permit register is published. Foreign military service is declared on a full register, and anyone subject to Australian jurisdiction who commits atrocity crimes is investigated and prosecuted on the evidence, in any uniform, without a political veto.

The through-line is the one the platform already commits to: one standard, applied to every state, including the ones Australia counts as friends.

11. Sources

1. UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, Legal analysis of the conduct of Israel in Gaza pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, presented to the Human Rights Council’s 60th session, 16 September 2025 — the finding that Israel is responsible for the commission of genocide in Gaza; four of the five acts under Article II established (killing; causing serious bodily or mental harm; deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about destruction; imposing measures intended to prevent births); genocidal intent established on the statements of senior Israeli officials; the recommendation that genocide charges be added to the existing International Criminal Court warrants; and the recommendation that states cease transferring arms and equipment that may be used in genocidal acts. Commission chaired by Navi Pillay. Cited in sections 2 and 10.
2. International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) — application filed December 2023; provisional measures ordered January 2024; South African memorial filed October 2024; Israeli counter-memorial filed March 2026; Order of 21 May 2026 fixing time-limits for a Reply and Rejoinder; numerous declarations of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute. No merits judgment has been delivered, and provisional measures are protective rather than a finding on the merits. Cited in sections 2 and 10.
3. International Court of Justice, advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem — the continued Israeli presence in the occupied Palestinian territory held unlawful and required to end as rapidly as possible; the settlement policy, the transfer of settlers and the associated regime held to breach international law; and the obligations of third states in consequence. Cited in sections 1 and 5.
4. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016) — Israeli settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. Cited in section 5.
5. UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Gaza Genocide: a collective crime (A/80/492), October 2025 — states continuing to grant or partially retain arms export licences to Israel while acknowledging concerns, naming the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia; continued transfer of F-35 parts notwithstanding litigation in the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, Denmark and the United Kingdom; the Arms Trade Treaty’s rejection of the “defensive” and “non-lethal” distinctions in favour of a holistic end-use assessment; and the record that thousands of nationals of third states have served in the Israeli military since October 2023, few investigated and none prosecuted for conduct in Gaza. Cited in sections 6 and 7.
6. Australian Government statements and reporting, 2025–26 — Australia’s recognition of the State of Palestine at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025; the Government’s position that it does not export weapons to Israel; and its participation in the global F-35 supply chain, the aircraft being operated by the Israeli Air Force. Cited in sections 1 and 6.
7. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Division 268 — genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as offences of universal jurisdiction, prosecutable in Australia irrespective of where the conduct occurred, with the written consent of the Attorney-General required under section 268.121 to commence proceedings, and the absence of any Australian register of, or declaration requirement for, service in foreign armed forces. Cited in section 7.
8. Sovereign Australia Party, Federal Platform §1.9, the foreign-influence Royal Commission — the uniform registration and disclosure standard with no exemption for allies; the Bob Carr characterisation of the pro-Israel lobby as the largest foreign influence operation run in Australia; research on privately sponsored parliamentary travel to Israel; and the express application of the identical standard to pro-Palestinian organisations, China-linked bodies and United States-funded institutes. Cited in sections 8 and 9.
9. Party positions as at July 2026 — Liberal Party of Australia media releases The Question of a Palestinian State (11 August 2025) and Labor’s Reckless Recognition of a Palestinian State (25 September 2025), stating the Coalition’s opposition to recognition, its call for the decision to be reversed, and its position that recognition follows a negotiated process; Australian Government statements on recognition at the United Nations General Assembly, September 2025, and on defence exports; reporting on the Australian Labor Party’s 2026 national conference platform debate, including advocacy by the Australian Palestinian Advocacy Network for an end to defence exports that risk contributing to atrocities; Australian Greens positions, including the abandonment of formal two-state support in 2023, the characterisation of the conduct in Gaza as genocide, and calls for sanctions and an arms embargo; and One Nation positions drawn from Senator Hanson’s public statements and Senate interventions, the party having published no policy document on these questions. Cited in section 9.
10. League of Arab States, Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States (the Casablanca Protocol), 1965; United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), 1948; and UNRWA registration practice — the provision that Palestinians in member states be afforded the right to work, residence and travel while retaining Palestinian nationality; the right of return affirmed in Resolution 194; the consequent practice across most host states of granting residence and services without naturalisation, so that refugee status and the associated claim are not extinguished; and Jordan as the principal exception, having conferred citizenship on most Palestinians originating from the West Bank. Cited in section 4.
11. Yesh Din — Volunteers for Human Rights, law-enforcement monitoring on ideologically motivated offences by Israelis against Palestinians in the West Bank, and associated Israeli and international reporting — the finding across two decades that the great majority of investigation files close without indictment and that approximately three per cent end in conviction, together with documented instances of military personnel present during attacks without intervening. Monitoring-organisation data rather than an official series. Cited in section 5.