The pact, the submarines, the cost, the US presence on Australian soil, sovereignty, and the alternative — five parties, from the public record and each party’s own statements, with the check date on the table. The Sovereign Australia column restates the published policy: AUKUS repositioned, not cancelled — the same yards and workforce redirected to sovereign capability, and AUASIA in its place.
Checked 27 August 2026. Sources: the AUKUS agreement documents and Defence announcements; the June 2026 confirmation of three second-hand Virginia-class boats; the Chief of the Defence Force’s August 2026 “enduring access” confirmation and the 27 August Henderson precinct announcement; the Greens’ End AUKUS platform; One Nation’s published defence statements and July 2026 reporting of its internal division; Sovereign Australia’s published defence policy and platform §3.1.
| Issue | Sovereign Australia | Labor | Coalition | One Nation | Greens |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The AUKUS pact Federal |
Repositioned, not cancelled — same workforce, same shipyards, same partnerships, redirected output. The submarine pathway ends; the alliance relationships do not. | Fully committed to both pillars. Pillar II undersea systems tested with the US at RIMPAC in July 2026. | Committed — the pact’s original author; criticises the government only on pace of delivery. | Supports the pact in principle — “it needs to happen” — though one of its senators broke ranks in July 2026 calling the plan “not credible”. | Would withdraw from the AUKUS pact and renegotiate Australia’s position in ANZUS. |
| The submarines Federal |
No nuclear-submarine purchase. The same yards build hundreds of unmanned coastal-defence platforms, dual-use vessels and the subsea corridor fleet — deployed capability this decade, not the 2040s. | Three second-hand Virginia-class boats from the United States — confirmed June 2026, revised from two used and one new — then SSN-AUKUS built at Osborne from the 2040s. | Backs the eight-boat nuclear pathway. | Backs the boats but says the deal “won’t deliver its promised capabilities for many years”; wants missiles and launch platforms now. | Cancel. Says a deal delivering only second-hand ten-year-old submarines “doesn’t stack up”. |
| The cost Federal |
The programmed $268–368 billion redirected: 3 per cent of GDP on defence, all of it sovereign capability — platforms, manufacturing and the industrial base under the SBC. | $368 billion to the 2050s stands, plus up to $8 billion at HMAS Stirling and the Henderson precinct, whose final site layout was announced on 27 August 2026. | Supports the program spend. | Supports the spend but says capability has “gone backward” while the money waits on delivery. | Says withdrawal saves $73 billion over ten years, redirected to dental in Medicare, public housing and free GP visits. |
| US forces on Australian soil Federal |
Australian command of every base on Australian soil, disclosable to parliament. A shore command, a squadron, a maintenance organisation and resident families are the constituent parts of a base, whatever the hulls do. | Submarine Rotational Force–West at HMAS Stirling from 2027, with “enduring access” confirmed by the Chief of the Defence Force in August 2026; described as rotational, not a base. 2,300 Americans expected by 2030. | Supports the US presence. | Calls the US alliance “vital” but says both majors have let American taxpayers foot the bill for Australia’s defence. | Opposes the expanding US military footprint. |
| Sovereignty of the capability Federal |
A capability a US president can lawfully withhold is not sovereign. Virginia transfers require statutory certification against US Navy needs, at a build rate running near half what certification requires. | Says transfers proceed under Australian “full knowledge and concurrence”, with sovereignty preserved. | States no sovereignty concern with the pathway. | Split on exactly this question — the leadership backs the pact; the dissenting senator says the boats will never be built as promised. | Says the pact obliges Australia to join a US–China conflict not of its choosing. |
| What instead Federal |
AUASIA — Australia in Asia. Armed, neutral, friend to all: the subsea corridor and grid union, sovereign fuel and energy, defence manufacturing, and internal strength as deterrence. | AUKUS is the plan; no alternative posture stated. | No alternative posture stated. | Missiles, strike platforms and recruitment now, inside the US alliance. | “Regional defence” — a smaller-range posture with the savings spent on diplomacy and social programs. |
Every Sovereign Australia cell restates the published policy — Defence — Not Attack and Part 3.1 of the platform. The full case — the cost assessment, the Garden Island record, and the AUASIA alternative in detail — is published on Modern Movement Australia: AUKUS in plain terms, The AUKUS Cost Blowout, and From AUKUS to AUASIA.